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Using  a sample  of  U.S.  lodging  ﬁrms,  this  paper  examines  the  relationship  between  board  of  director  char-
acteristics  and  chief  executive  ofﬁcer  (CEO)  compensation.  Previous  research  shows  that  larger  boards
are  detrimental  to the  effectiveness  of  the board  of directors  and  deteriorate  the  control  imposed  on CEO
actions  and  pay.  Board  independence  is  also  suggested  as  an important  quality  to  emphasize  the  control
on the  CEO.  We  propose  that  U.S.  lodging  ﬁrms’  board  of  directors  provide  a nice  setting  to investigate  the
effects  of size  and  independence  on CEO  compensation  level.  Our  ﬁndings  suggest  that  CEO  compensation
is  not related  to board  size,  and  positively  related  to  proportion  of  the  outside  board  members.  These
ﬁndings  are  contrary  to  the  ﬁndings  of  previous  studies.  Our  ﬁndings  may  provide  signiﬁcant  insights  to
lodging  ﬁrms’  board  of directors  to structure  efﬁcient  compensation  packages.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this study, we examine the board characteristics of U.S. lodg-
ing ﬁrms and the role of board of directors on chief executive
ofﬁcer (CEO) compensation within the agency theory framework.
Core et al. (1999) concluded that board of director decisions are
greatly inﬂuenced by CEOs. Therefore, boards that are under the
inﬂuence of their CEO are likely to fail in setting effective compen-
sation contracts, which are designed to protect owners’ interests in
the company while at the same time meeting CEO’s expectations
for his/her service to the company. The primary goal of an effec-
tive board of directors should be to safeguard the owners’ interests
against those of the managers and align these conﬂicting interests
to achieve mutual beneﬁts (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2005). Therefore,
boards should act as a monitoring and controlling body on behalf of
the shareholders (Core et al., 1999). To carry out these duties, board
independence is critically important. Outside board members who
have no previous or current afﬁliation with the ﬁrm ensure board
independence. Nonetheless, it should be noted that board of direc-
tors consists of both outside and inside members, and the presence
of inside board members jeopardizes the independence of the
board. As Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) put it, if the board structure
alleviates CEO monitoring, compensation contracts are optimal
and reﬂect only the economic determinants of performance. They
further continue their argument that if the director election pro-
cess is inﬂuenced by the CEO, independence of the board is
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compromised and CEO monitoring is rendered ineffective. An
empowered CEO gives himself/herself the opportunity to maximize
his/her own wealth through higher compensation over market
equilibrium. To ensure board independence, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and stock exchanges have mandated
publicly traded companies to comply with the rules and guidelines
that were set forth by the governing agencies. This consequently
assured the presence of an important number of independent
members in U.S. corporate boards. We  examine this so-called board
independence at an industry level for reasons described in the sub-
sequent sections, taking our sample from the U.S. lodging industry.
1.1. Why  the lodging industry?
A signiﬁcant number of studies have investigated the pay-
performance relationship of executives in the hospitality industry
(Kim and Gu, 2005; Gu and Choi, 2004; Madanoglu and Karadag,
2008). Some researchers, on the other hand, examined the rela-
tionship between pay practices and ﬁrm performance of all
levels of employees in the lodging industry (Namasivayam et al.,
2007). Another stream of research has investigated pay differences
between hospitality jobs and non-hospitality jobs (Sturman, 2001).
Furthermore, a more recent study compared the pay gap between
male and female CEOs in the tourism industry and compared the
ﬁndings to those of the manufacturing industry (Skalpe, 2007). Nev-
ertheless, none of these studies shed light on the board of directors’
characteristics in the hospitality industry, and their potential rela-
tionship with executive pay. Keiser (2002) compared the boards of
lodging, restaurant, and airline industries and revealed interlock-
ing relationships. Yet, his study did not aim at providing any insight
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as to how those board characteristics are related to executive com-
pensation.
Cahan et al. (2005) and Ghosh and Sirmans’s (2005) studies
showed that the boards of directors of governmental agencies or
speciﬁc types of business forms, such as Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs), impose varying degree of board controls on CEO
pay. Indeed, boards in different industries may  present varying
characteristics. For example, Keiser (2002) explored the board of
director characteristics of hotel, restaurant, and airline industries,
and revealed interlocking relationships. His study pointed out that
hotels have the least number of total board members (8.8 per
ﬁrm) and the highest percentage of inside board members (29.55%)
among the three industries. These ﬁndings further support the pur-
pose of this study. Boyd (1994) states that smaller boards inﬂuence
greater control on ﬁrms. Therefore, given the small board size of
hotel ﬁrms, we would expect a high level of board control and a
lower compensation on the lodging ﬁrms’ CEOs. On the other hand,
agency theory suggests that boards that have a higher proportion
of outside members have more control on ﬁrms. Therefore, boards
of lodging ﬁrms that include a higher number of insiders are sup-
posed to exert less control on CEO compensation, resulting in higher
compensation for the CEOs. We  investigate this issue in the lodging
ﬁrms’ board structure and contribute to the executive compensa-
tion literature by providing evidence of how board structure in the
U.S. lodging industry impacts CEO compensation.
2. Review of related literature
2.1. Pay-performance relationship
The principal-agent theory implies that executives are agents of
the shareholders and try to maximize shareholder wealth through
improved returns (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2005; Welbourne and Cyr,
1999). When agents set forth a different agenda from the other
stakeholders of the ﬁrm, the so-called agency problem occurs
(Attaway, 2000; Welbourne and Cyr, 1999). In order to prevent
the conﬂicting interests of agents and principals, researchers have
suggested aligning agents’ interests with owners’ interests. How-
ever, investigations of the link between CEO compensation and
ﬁrm performance have resulted in mixed ﬁndings. Attaway (2000)
found a weak relationship between CEO pay and return on equity
(ROE). Likewise, Baker et al. (1988) used sales growth as an indi-
cator of CEO pay and found a weak relationship. Madura et al.
(1996) revealed that no statistically signiﬁcant relationship exists
between executive compensation and ROE. Furthermore, Kim and
Gu (2005) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between return
on investment and CEO cash compensation in the U.S. restaurant
industry. On the other hand, some researchers reported a positive
association between pay and performance. Among those, Veliyath
and Bishop (1995) reported that companies that reward their CEOs
with higher compensation yield higher ROE. Additionally, Gu and
Choi (2004) found a positive relationship between CEO cash com-
pensation and return on assets (ROA). The recent approach for the
pay-performance studies has been to investigate the role of the
board of directors on setting the CEO pay (Boyd, 1994). In accor-
dance with the pay-performance literature, board structure-CEO
pay research is also investigated within the agency theory frame-
work.
2.2. Board of directors as a control mechanism
Board of directors is the controlling body that monitors the CEO
decisions and protects shareholders’ rights. Therefore, the board
is the representative of the shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983)
and is the primary internal control mechanism that is responsible
for setting management compensation and monitoring manage-
ment (Mizruchi, 1983; Walsh and Seward, 1990; Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1988; Tosi et al., 1997). The literature about the board
characteristics and CEO pay has received substantial interest and
has resulted in mixed ﬁndings.
The number of board members is seen to be an important
factor to increase the effectiveness of a board to do its con-
trolling task (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). When the
board membership is large, it is difﬁcult to establish a consen-
sus among the board members to create opposition against the
CEO, and work productivity declines (Cahan et al., 2005). Sim-
ilarly, it is also argued that in a large board, coordination is
difﬁcult, and free riding (a board member’s reliance on other mem-
bers of the board to make board decisions) becomes a problem
(Steiner, 1972). When it comes to ﬁrm value, Yermack (1996) found
that ﬁrms with smaller boards have higher ﬁrm values. Support-
ively, as evidence from the Finnish market, Eisenberg et al. (1998)
found that the larger the board, the lower the ﬁrm proﬁtabil-
ity.
Outside directors who  have no relationship with the ﬁrm are
considered more independent and, therefore, are expected to assert
more control on CEO performance and pay than inside board mem-
bers. Boards with a higher percentage of outside board members
are deemed to be more effective for two reasons (Conyon and
Peck, 1998). First, outside board members have the incentive to
signal their managerial competence to other potential employers
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988). Second, outside mem-
bers already have expertise in monitoring top management teams
in other companies (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The relationship
between top executive compensation and outside member repre-
sentation has yielded mixed results. Boyd (1994) and Lambert et al.
(1991) present a positive relation between CEO compensation and
the percentage of the board composed of outside directors. Con-
trarily, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) report that compensation
is not related to the proportion of outside directors on the board of
directors.
Boards that include members who  sit on other companies’
boards are also relatively less efﬁcient in monitoring top man-
agement activities compared to the boards that are composed
of members with fewer other directorship duties. This is in part
due to the time devoted to each single board that the members
serve on. Opposed to this view, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue
that multiple directorship can in fact be valuable because it adds
to the director’s experience and knowledge base. Furthermore,
Shivdasani (1993) and Talmor and Wallace (2000) found a pos-
itive relationship between the number of directorships and CEO
compensation, whereas Core et al. (1999) found a negative rela-
tionship.
The age of the board members is also considered to be a signiﬁ-
cant factor that contributes to the effectiveness of the board. Core
et al. (1999) suggest that outside directors may  become less effec-
tive as they grow older. Therefore, boards with a larger proportion
of old-aged outside board members are less effective in controlling
CEO actions and compensations.
CEO-duality effect has been another important variable inves-
tigated by previous research (Jensen, 1993; Kesner et al., 1986).
CEO duality occurs when CEO also serves as the chair of the board.
Jensen (1993) states that to improve monitoring effectiveness, the
CEO should not be the chair of the board. The reason behind this
argument is that if the CEO serves as the chair of the board, he/she
will set the agenda, conﬁgure committees, decide on operating
procedures, and communicate with other board members. Previ-
ous empirical ﬁndings are inconclusive for this expectation though.
Kesner et al. (1986) found no evidence of a CEO-duality effect, while
Beatty and Zajac (1994) found that CEO-duality can be suboptimal
for board effectiveness.
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3. Research hypotheses
As discussed in the preceding section, previous studies found
mixed results for the relation between board size and CEO com-
pensation. One would expect that as the board size gets larger, the
control on CEO compensation weakens for various reasons such as
disagreements among members and personal ties of older mem-
bers with the CEO. Larger boards require the agreement of more
people on any decision to be made and realized. The mixed results
of previous research studies dissuaded us from establishing a one-
sided hypothesis to examine the relation between board size and
CEO compensation. Therefore, we shape our ﬁrst hypothesis as fol-
lows:
Hypothesis 1. CEO compensation is related to board size in the
U.S. lodging industry.
Although we believe that board size is a strong indicator of board
control of CEO compensation, there are other board qualities that
are very likely to have an inﬂuence on CEO compensation. Out-
side member representation, age of outside board members, and
busy directors are three important board qualities that have been
extensively used in previous studies. We  also include these three
indicator variables in our study since we believe that they have a
possible control effect on CEO compensation. We  further develop
three hypotheses and investigate these as Hypotheses 2a, 2b and
2c.
Hypothesis 2a. CEO compensation is negatively related to the
proportion of outside board members in the U.S. lodging industry.
Hypothesis 2b. CEO compensation is positively related to the
proportion of busy directors in the U.S. lodging industry.
Hypothesis 2c. CEO compensation is positively related to the pro-
portion of old-aged directors in the U.S. lodging industry.
Our last hypothesis seeks to reveal whether there exists a CEO
duality effect on setting CEO pay level. The underlying idea behind
this hypothesis is simple and clear. If the CEO is the chair of the
board, he/she has a strong say in his/her own compensation con-
tract and a substantial inﬂuence on board members to convince
them to increase his/her own wealth. Hence, with this third hypoth-
esis, we test whether CEO duality is an issue in the U.S. lodging
industry to determine CEO compensation levels.
Hypothesis 3. CEO compensation is positively related to CEO dual-
ity in the U.S. lodging industry.
4. Research method
4.1. Sample selection
Data were collected from 2002 to 2008 through two different
data sources. We  searched the COMPUSTAT database for NAICS
code 721110 “hotels (except casino hotels) and motels”. COMPU-
STAT database returned 27 ﬁrms, of which twelve were inactive
and ﬁfteen were active. Out of these ﬁfteen active companies, two
were privatized and one ﬁled bankruptcy between 2002 and 2008.
For this reason, these three companies were also excluded from
the sample pool. Additionally, three of the remaining twelve active
companies were foreign companies, one of which did not provide
executive compensation information for the period 2002–2008.
Consequently, we had to exclude these four companies as well. We
then ended up with eight publicly traded companies from COM-
PUSTAT. We  bolstered our sample size with an additional four
companies that were publicly traded during the period 2002–2008,
but which were not included in COMPUSTAT. We  obtained these
companies from the NYSE industry listings, where they are listed
under the Travel and Leisure Consumer Services classiﬁcation. To
ensure the consistency between COMPUSTAT ﬁrms and NYSE ﬁrms,
we veriﬁed that the main business of these four companies is hotels
and lodging related services. Despite the fact that our sample size
appears to be small, we  are in fact collecting information on the
entire population of publicly traded lodging ﬁrms for the period
2002–2008. There are no other ﬁrms from which we  can collect
data.
Most data were hand-collected from annual reports (10-K) and
proxy reports (DEF-14) that were ﬁled with the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC). The ﬁrm performance measure, ROA, was  cal-
culated using the accounting data from 10-K reports.
Compensation data were collected from annual proxy state-
ments. Salary and bonus along with all other types of compensation
components are available in the executive compensation section of
the proxy statements.
Board structure data were also hand-collected from the annual
proxy statements. Firms are mandated to disclose the list of their
board members each year and also convey information about the
new nominations for opening spots on the board. The number of
board members is disclosed along with brief information about
each member. In this small paragraph for each member, ﬁrms
disclose information about current professional positions held, pre-
vious positions held, professional afﬁliations, age, and directorship
in other company boards. We  needed to collect our board data
through these disclosures for each board member in each year for
each company for the period 2002–2008. We  are interested in the
total number of board members, the number of insiders and out-
siders, the age of each member, directorship in other ﬁrms, and CEO
duality.
Our ﬁnal data set included a total of 64 ﬁrm-year observations
collected from 12 ﬁrms that provided board and ﬁnancial informa-
tion between the years 2002 and 2008.
4.2. Variables and model
CEO compensation.  CEO compensation is composed of two ele-
ments: salary and bonus. In this study, we  use the total cash
compensation as the proxy of CEO compensation. Salary plus bonus
has been used in many previous studies mostly due to its imme-
diate availability from proxy statements and ease of calculation.
More comprehensive proxies for compensation such as deferred
beneﬁts, stock options, and stock awards have been avoided pri-
marily because of the complexity of deriving these ﬁgures. Previous
research has proved that total cash compensation (salary plus
bonus) is a good proxy of more comprehensive deferred compen-
sation (Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970). For sensitivity analysis, we
include stock options and stock awards in our total compensation
variable, and derive close results to those when we use only cash
compensation. We  use the logarithmic transformation of compen-
sation to reduce the heteroskedasticity as suggested by Finkelstein
and Hambrick (1989).
Board control.  Board control variables are the main interest of
this study. We  hypothesize the board control through ﬁve board
characteristics. The level of board inﬂuence asserted on managers’
decisions highly depends on the board size, percentage of out-
side board members, directorships at other company boards, age
of board members, and CEO duality. Our proxy for the board size is
the total number of directors serving on the board of directors. As
we have discussed previously, to account for the board indepen-
dence, we use the percentage of outside board members to total
board members. Consistent with Core et al. (1999),  we deﬁne an
outside director to be busy if he/she serves on three or more cor-
porate boards. An old director is deﬁned to be one who is 69 or
older (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2005). Similar to the comparison used
for busy directors, we use a percentage measure as the proxy for
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old-aged directors, which is deﬁned as the ratio of the number of
old-aged outside directors to the total number of outside directors.
For the last board variable, CEO duality, we use a dummy  variable
for which we code 1 in the case CEO is also the board chair and 0
otherwise.
Firm performance and ﬁrm size. To control for potential ﬁrm
performance effect on compensation, we include ROA in our regres-
sions. Given the small sample size, we avoid including more control
variables in our models and do not include a market performance
proxy (stock return) in our model. Yet, in untabulated results, we
further include stock return in our tests; however, the coefﬁcient
for stock return was consistently insigniﬁcant. We  also control for
the effect of ﬁrm size on the compensation. Our proxy for the ﬁrm
size is the natural logarithm of total sales.
We estimate the following model via ordinary least square
regression (OLS). Reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. No signiﬁcant outlier was  detected in
the data. The scatter plot of residuals against our dependent vari-
able shows a randomly scattered pattern. Furthermore, none of the
standardized residuals exceeds the threshold point of 3.
lnCashCamp = 0 + 1BrdSize + 2OutPerc + 3BusyPerc
+4OldPerc + 5CeoCh + 6Roa + 7lnSales + ε (1)
lnCashComp: natural logarithm of total cash compensation (salary
plus bonus). BrdSize: number of board members serving on com-
panies’ board of directors. OutPerc: proportion of outside board
members to total board members. BusyPerc: proportion of busy
outside board members to total outside board members. For an
outside member to be classiﬁed as busy, he/she should be serv-
ing on 3 or more other company boards. OldPerc: proportion of old
outside board members to total outside board members. An outside
member is classiﬁed as old if he/she is age 69 or over. CeoCh:  CEO
duality effect. It takes values of 1 and 0 depending on whether the
CEO serves as the chair of the board. If the CEO is the chair of the
board, then CeoCh is 1; otherwise it is 0. Roa: return on assets calcu-
lated as the net income divided by the total assets. lnSales:  natural
logarithm of total sales.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample ﬁrms
over the years 2002–2008. Lodging company boards on average
included 8.81 members with a maximum of 13 and a minimum of
6 board members. Keiser (2002) also found a mean board size of 8.8
for the hotel industry; therefore, our ﬁnding is consistent with his
ﬁndings. Moreover, a mean board membership of 8.81 for the lodg-
ing industry is also consistent with the ﬁndings of other studies.
Ghosh and Sirmans’ (2005) sample on average had 8.18 directors,
and Chhaochharia and Grinstein’s (2009) had on average 9.78 direc-
tors. Other studies yielded relatively high and low mean values for
board size when they included larger sample sizes. Conyon and Peck
(1998) used a sample that had an average board size of 6.6, while
Core et al.’s (1999) sample had an average board size of 13. On aver-
age, outside board members composed 79% of the entire board. This
statistic in turn should imply a high control on manager decisions
given that outside board members impose greater control on cor-
porate executives. The OldPerc variable is meant to catch the loose
control due to the director’s age. Old directors made up 14% of total
outside board members. Likewise, busy directors are also likely to
inﬂuence less control on CEOs actions since they also have responsi-
bilities on other company boards they sit on. Thirty-three percent
of outside board members turned out to be busy for the lodging
companies used in this study. On average, in 38% of the cases, the
CEO was also the chair of the board of directors. We report both the
real dollar amount and log of cash compensation in Table 1. In our
sample, CEOs earned, on average, a total cash (salary plus bonus)
compensation of $987,009 annually. Mean of log compensation, on
the other hand, was 13.59. Lastly, we  report descriptive statistics
for the control measures. The average lodging ﬁrm in our sample
had a 4.53% ROA. Moreover, the mean of log of sales (size proxy)
was  20.27 with a maximum of 23.28 and a minimum of 18.03.
5.2. Empirical ﬁndings
Table 2 reports the Pearson pairwise correlation among the vari-
ables. Unsurprisingly, size is highly correlated with compensation
(0.6656). This conﬁrms that larger ﬁrms have more resources to
reward their executives. The correlation between old member per-
centage and CEO duality is signiﬁcantly high. This high correlation
can be explained by the fact that as outside board members grow
older and have worked in a particular company board for several
years, they develop personal relationships with the CEO and take
a favorable position in regard to the appointment of the CEO as
the board chair. Outside member percentage and CEO duality vari-
ables have a signiﬁcant and negative correlation (−0.5066), which
is not surprising given the board independence theory. There is
also a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between busy member
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Panel A. Dependent variable
Cashcomp $987,009 $754,679 $216,000 $3,802,365
lnCashComp 13.5815 0.6523 12.2830 15.1511
Panel B. Explanatory variables
Board variables
Brdsize 8.8125 1.4571 6.0000 13.0000
OutPerc 0.7882 0.1227 0.5000 1.0000
BusyPerc 0.3264 0.2985 0.0000 0.6134
OldPerc 0.1370 0.1607 0.0000 0.5714
CeoCh 0.3750 0.4880 0.0000 1.0000
Control variables
Roa 0.0453 0.0971 −0.0721 0.3719
lnSales 20.2662 1.4263 18.0341 23.2875
Cashcomp:  sum of annual salary and bonus. lnCashComp: natural logarithm of total cash compensation (salary plus bonus). BrdSize: number of board members serving on
companies’ board of directors. OutPerc: proportion of outside board members to total outside board members. BusyPerc: proportion of busy outside board members to total
outside  board members. For an outside member to be classiﬁed as busy, he/she should be serving in 3 or more other company boards. OldPerc: proportion of old outside
board  members to total outside board members. An outside member is classiﬁed as old if he/she is at the age of 69 or over. CeoCh:  CEO duality effect. It takes values of 1 and
0  depending on whether the CEO serves as the chair of the board. If the CEO is the chair of the board, then CeoCh is 1; otherwise it is 0. Roa: return on assets calculated as the
net  income divided by the total assets. lnSales: natural logarithm of total sales.
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Table  2
Pearson pairwise correlations.
lnCashComp BrdSize OutPerc BusyPerc OldPerc CeoCh Roa lnSales
lnCashComp 1
BrdSize 0.3382* 1
0.0063
OutPerc 0.4004* −0.0461 1
0.0010 0.7178
BusyPerc 0.0674 0.1432 −0.4964* 1
0.5968 0.2591 0.0000
OldPerc −0.0714 0.3392* −0.4833* 0.2969* 1
0.5750 0.0061 0.0001 0.0172
CeoCh 0.1955 0.4800* −0.5066* 0.5043* 0.5479* 1
0.1216 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Roa  0.2622* 0.1119 0.1731 −0.0425 0.0988 −0.1307 1
0.0363 0.3785 0.1713 0.7390 0.4371 0.3032
lnSales 0.6656* 0.4085* 0.2975* 0.2131 −0.1974 0.2046 0.1932 1
0.0000 0.0008 0.0170 0.0909 0.1179 0.1049 0.1262
See Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions.
* Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
percentage and CEO duality (0.5043). This relationship is not sur-
prising either, because as described before, busier board members
are more likely to fail to fulﬁll their board duties and exert less
control on CEO actions. There was a negative correlation between
outside member percentage and busy member percentage vari-
ables (−0.4964). This was  quite surprising and contrary to our
expectation as well as to what the theory states. We  would expect
to see more busy directors in company boards with larger out-
side member representation, but the relationship was  the inverse.
Similarly, old member percentage was negatively correlated with
outside member percentage (−0.4833). Similarly, we  would expect
that outsider-concentrated boards have more busy directors since
they are likely to be large ﬁrms that target to have high-proﬁle
board members on their boards. Moreover, these high-proﬁle board
members are very likely to serve in other company boards. When
it comes to the board size, which is one of our main variables for
this study, it was positively correlated (0.48) with CEO duality. This
correlation states that larger boards tend to have their CEO serve
as the board chair. Further, board size is also correlated (0.3392)
with old member representation, meaning that as the board size
increases, so does the percentage of older outside directors. Firm
size (lnSales) is also positively correlated with the board size, which
basically suggests that as a ﬁrm grows in size, the board of directors
includes more members.
In Table 3, we document the ﬁndings of the regression of com-
pensation on board characteristics. The overall model is signiﬁcant
(F = 10.44, p = 0.0000) and has a moderate explanatory power (adj.
R-sq = 51.20%).
The coefﬁcient on BrdSize variable is insigniﬁcant (p = 0.95). This
result led us to reject Hypothesis 1. Insigniﬁcant BrdSize variable
was  contrary to results in previous research. Talmor and Wallace
(2000),  Core et al. (1999),  Cahan et al. (2005),  and Ghosh and
Sirmans (2005) found a signiﬁcant relationship between board size
and CEO compensation. Their ﬁnding is consistent with Yermack’s
(1996) ﬁndings that larger boards are less effective in monitor-
ing because of the lack of interaction among board members. In
this regard, our insigniﬁcant ﬁnding is intriguing. The insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcient on our BrdSize variable may  be partly due to the small
Table 3
Regression of total cash compensation on board variables.
Variables Coefﬁcient Std. error t p
Cons. 7.377526 0.9638414 7.65 0.000
Board variables
BrdSize −0.0032314 0.0516057 −0.06 0.950
OutPerc 2.265726 0.6936681 3.27 0.002
BusyPerc 0.049136 0.2546698 0.19 0.848
OldPerc 0.1520876 0.5133157 0.30 0.768
CeoCh 0.4119753 0.189084 2.18 0.034
Control variables
Roa 0.9335081 0.6486014 1.44 0.156
lnSales 0.2078829 0.0579857 3.59 0.001
Model summary
R-sq 56.63%
Adj. R-sq 51.20%
F-statistic 10.44
F  signiﬁcance 0.000
Observations 64
In this table, we report the ﬁndings of Eq. (1).  We estimate the impact of board composition variables on the CEO compensation controlling for the economic determinants
of  CEO compensation. We  control for the effects of return on assets (Roa) and ﬁrm size (lnSales) on the CEO compensation:
lnCashCamp = 0 + 1BrdSize + 2OutPerc + 3BusyPerc + 4OldPerc + 5CeoCh + 6Roa + 7lnSales + ε
lnCashComp:  natural logarithm of annual salary plus bonus. BrdSize: number of board members serving on companies’ board of directors. OutPerc: proportion of outside board
members to total outside board members. BusyPerc: proportion of busy outside board members to total outside board members. For an outside member to be classiﬁed as
busy,  he/she should be serving in 3 or more other company boards. OldPerc: proportion of old outside board members to total outside board members. An outside member
is  classiﬁed as old if he/she is at the age of 69 or over. CeoCh:  CEO duality effect. It takes values of 1 and 0 depending on whether the CEO serves as the chair of the board. If
the  CEO is the chair of the board then CeoCh is 1; otherwise it is 0. Roa: return on assets calculated as the net income divided by the total assets. lnSales: natural logarithm of
total  sales.
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Table 4
Regression of total compensation on board variables.
Variables Coefﬁcient Std. error t p
Cons. 2.305224 1.058915 2.18 0.034
Board variables
BrdSize −0.114031 0.0566961 −2.01 0.049
OutPerc 2.649617 0.7620914 3.48 0.001
BusyPerc 0.5165798 0.2797905 1.85 0.070
OldPerc 0.5421882 0.5639492 0.96 0.340
CeoCh 0.2771937 0.2077353 1.33 0.187
Control variables
Roa 1.725628 0.7125794 2.42 0.019
lnSales 0.5124773 0.0637054 8.04 0.000
Model summary
R-sq 78.05%
Adj. R-sq 75.30%
F-statistic 28.44
F  signiﬁcance 0.000
Observations 64
In this table, we report the ﬁndings when Eq. (1) is re-estimated with a different measure for dependent variable. In this analysis, we  use the total compensation, measured as
the  sum of salary, bonus, fair value of stock options, and fair value of stock rewards. We estimate the impact of board composition variables on CEO compensation controlling
for  return on assets (Roa) and ﬁrm size (lnSales):
lnTotalCamp = 0 + 1BrdSize + 2OutPerc + 3BusyPerc + 4OldPerc + 5CeoCh + 6Roa + 7lnSales + ε
lnTotalComp:  natural logarithm m total compensation. Total compensation is proxied as the sum of salary, bonus, fair value of stock options, and fair value of stock awards.
BrdSize:  number of board members serving in companies’ board of directors. OutPerc: proportion of outside board members to total outside board members. BusyPerc:
proportion of busy outside board members to total outside board members. For an outside member to be classiﬁed as busy, he/she should be serving in 3 or more other
company boards. OldPerc: proportion of old outside board members to total outside board members. An outside member is classiﬁed as old if he/she is at the age of 69 or
over.  CeoCh:  CEO duality effect. It takes values of 1 and 0 depending on whether the CEO serves as the chair of the board. If the CEO is the chair of the board then CeoCh is 1;
otherwise it is 0. Roa: return on assets calculated as the net income divided by the total assets. lnSales: natural logarithm of total sales.
sample size. In this study, we use only data from lodging ﬁrms
between 2002 and 2008, which in turn produced only 64 ﬁrm-year
observations.
The coefﬁcient for outside member representation variable is
signiﬁcant (p = 0.002), but in the inverse direction to what we
had expected. We  had argued that outside member representation
increases the level of control imposed upon CEOs and leads to tight-
ened compensation packages. Therefore, the positive coefﬁcient on
the OutPerc is intriguing, contrary to our expectation, and needs
further investigation. One possible explanation for the observed
positive association between outside member representation and
CEO’s compensation is the CEO’s power to inﬂuence the decision
process regarding who will serve on the board of directors. If the
CEO is also the chair of the board, then he/she has inﬂuence over
the decision to solicit outside board members. Clearly he/she will
attempt to get members over whom he/she can exercise control. A
board composed of members in this manner will potentially favor
higher compensation for CEOs because even the board members
are interested in getting re-nominated to the board. Therefore, we
expect a higher compensation for CEOs when he/she is also the
board chair. To test this proposition, we run two regressions of
total cash compensation on the outside member percentage vari-
able controlling for ﬁrm performance (ROA) and ﬁrm size (lnSales)
for two subgroups of our sample. The ﬁrst subsample comprises
cases (24 ﬁrm-year observations) where the CEO is also the chair
of the board. The second group consists of all other cases (40 ﬁrm-
year observations) where the CEO is not the chair of the board.
Consistent with our expectation, the coefﬁcient for outside percent-
age is signiﬁcantly positive in the regression in which we used the
ﬁrst group; and it was insigniﬁcant in the regression for the second
group suggesting that when the CEO is chair of the board, outside
members favor CEO’s compensation; whereas when the CEO is not
the chair of the board, CEO’s compensation is not related to outside
member representation. This ﬁnding helps us explain the positive
coefﬁcient on the OutPerc variable in the main regression.
As the tenure and experience of a board member expands over
the years, he/she is recruited by other ﬁrms to serve as a board
member. As indicated before, an increase in the number of boards
will result in less attention to each board. Therefore, we  expect less
monitoring on the CEO’s actions and consequently a positive coef-
ﬁcient on the busy percentage variable. However, results in Table 3
show that there is no signiﬁcant relationship between busy mem-
ber representation and compensation. Therefore, Hypothesis 2b is
rejected. High representation of old-aged board members in a com-
pany board is also deemed to be detrimental to control put forth
on CEOs for the reasons described earlier. Yet, our ﬁndings do not
conclude this expectation. The coefﬁcient on OldPerc is insigniﬁcant
leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 2c.
The last board characteristic variable in our analysis is the CeoCh,
CEO duality effect. The signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient on CEO
duality variable (CeoCh) conﬁrms our expectation that CEOs that
are also chairs of the board, earn higher compensation. The coefﬁ-
cient is also economically strong. When the CEO serves as the board
chair, his/her compensation is 41.20% higher. High economic sig-
niﬁcance of this coefﬁcient shows that CEOs extract a substantial
rent when they occupy the chair position in the board of directors.
Among the control variables, size is signiﬁcant but ROA is not.
A 1% increase in the ﬁrm size leads to 20.8% increase in CEO’s cash
compensation in our sample.
6. Further speciﬁcations
Thus far, our analysis used the total cash pay as the proxy for
CEO compensation. In a further speciﬁcation, we  use the sum of
cash and equity-based compensation as the proxy for CEO com-
pensation. Our measure for equity-based compensation is the sum
of fair value of stock options and stock awards awarded to CEOs. We
collect option and stock data from the annual proxy reports (DEF-
14) of our sample companies for the years 2002–2008. We  expect
that our predictions hold after this speciﬁcation in the dependent
variable. We  re-estimate Eq. (1) with the new dependent variable.
Consistent with the ﬁrst test, we  use a logarithmic transforma-
tion of the new dependent variable to correct heteroskedasticity
inherent in the data. OutPerc and lnSales remain signiﬁcant with
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similar signs. However, CEO duality is no longer signiﬁcant. Firm
performance (ROA) is signiﬁcant in the total compensation regres-
sion. This indeed explains that when the compensation includes
equity-based compensation, managers put much effort to increase
the performance of the company (see Table 4).
As an extension to our main analysis, we also run two sets of
regression where we include the ﬁrm speciﬁc effect and year effect
dummies in the analysis. One could argue that there might be ﬁrm
speciﬁc, time invariant effects that indeed lead to changes in the
compensation. Ignoring these ﬁrm speciﬁc effects might lead one to
overemphasize the effect of other variables included in the regres-
sion. With the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects included in our model, the variation
within ﬁrms is not sufﬁcient to identify the effects of board charac-
teristics on the compensation. Given that we have a heterogeneous
group of companies and that we are concerned with the small sam-
ple size, we do not include ﬁrm speciﬁc effects in our main analysis.
One could also be concerned about the year effect. Without control-
ling for the year effect, our model ignores any macro-level changes
over the years that may  well affect the compensation over the years.
To control for that, we include a year dummy  as well and re-run the
original model. We  ﬁnd a signiﬁcant year effect. When we include
year dummies, outside percentage and ﬁrm size are still impor-
tant determinants of the compensation, whereas the CEO duality
becomes insigniﬁcant.
7. Discussion and conclusion
We examined the effect of board control on the CEO compensa-
tion level for the US lodging ﬁrms spanning a period between 2002
and 2008. Our results showed that board size is not a determinant of
CEO compensation level for lodging ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is contrary
to the ﬁndings of Core et al. (1999),  Talmor and Wallace (2000),
Cahan et al. (2005),  and Ghosh and Sirmans (2005).  Our insigniﬁ-
cant ﬁnding indicates that there may  be different determinants of
CEO compensation across industries. Even though we  use a similar
approach as in previous research, we ended up with an insigniﬁcant
relationship between board size and CEO compensation.
One would also expect to observe tightened compensation lev-
els for the ﬁrms that employ a board of directors with higher outside
member representation. However, our ﬁndings suggest an opposite
picture for the U.S. lodging industry. It seems that CEOs enjoy more
compensation when their companies’ boards of directors encom-
pass more outside board members. As discussed earlier, for the
companies where the CEO holds the chair position in the board of
directors, the CEO may  use that power to select outside members
into the board that he/she believes will favor his/her compensation.
In addition to outside membership, we also examined the possible
effects of busy directors and old directors on CEO compensation
level. None of these variables explains the variation in CEO’s com-
pensation. Based on our ﬁndings, 38% of the CEOs in our sample also
held the board chair position, and being the chair of the board sig-
niﬁcantly increases the cash compensation they earn. Even though
we expected a stronger effect on total compensation, we  did not
observe this effect.
In summary, we found both opposing and conﬁrming results to
the previous studies, further strengthening the need to continue
conducting studies of the lodging industry. We  provided evidence
to the board composition – CEO compensation literature from the
U.S lodging industry. Although the industry is large in business vol-
ume, data are limited to the companies that are publicly traded.
Our ﬁndings are, therefore, limited in this sense. To overcome this
problem, a larger time-period can be used to get larger time-series
data. To increase the knowledge in this area, future researchers
might consider examining the effect of other phenomenon on
the CEO compensation. For instance, inclusion of ownership
structure (institutional, individual etc.) into this analysis is impor-
tant. Previous research (Core et al., 1999) has shown that ownership
structure is an important determinant of CEO compensation. Firms
that have varying degree of institutional vs. individual investors
might reward CEOs differently. Board independence, which is the
focus of this study, is an important governance quality to control
CEO actions and monitor the well-functioning of the organization.
Other governance qualities like ownership structure and gover-
nance index (G-index) could also be examined so as to see whether
the governance control does really matter in setting CEO com-
pensation contracting. Moreover, further research can examine
whether CEO turnover may  affect this relationship. In addition to
this empirical analysis with archival data, a survey analysis of board
of directors of selected companies can provide ﬁrst hand insight
from the industry. Obviously, our ﬁndings are limited to U.S. lodg-
ing industry. For further analysis, international data might be very
helpful to shed light on the board structure-executive compensa-
tion phenomenon at a global level.
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